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FOREWORD
The way in which we finance public elementary and secondary schools'

causes substantial inequalities in the raising of educational revenues and in
the distribution of educational resources in nearly every state in the nation-

Hawaii being the only possible exception.' While there has been pressure
for reform since the beginning of this century, 2 efforts to bring about

reform through litigation did not get under way until the late 1960's. 3 And
it was not until late 1971, with Serrano v. Priest, that the reformers
4
achieved their first real victory.

The California Supreme Court put forward a negative constitutional prin-

ciple: the quality of public education may not be "a function of the wealth
of... [a pupil's] parents and neighbors."' This so-called principle of
"fiscal neutrality" was first articulated by Professors Coons, Clune, and
7
Sugarman 6 in order to avoid the barriers raised by the McInnis case.
The plaintiffs in that case had contended that "only a financing system

which apportions public funds according to the educational needs of the
student satisfies the 14th Amendment,"8 but the court found that this
was not a judicially manageable standard. By contrast, the fiscal neuR. REISCHAUER & R. HARTMAN, REFORMING SCHOOL FINANCE 66 (1973).
See J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 49-61
(1970).
' See, e.g., Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D.
Tex. 1971) (litigation commenced 1968, Civil No. 68-175-SA); Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp.
327 (N.D. II1. 1968) (litigation commenced 1968, Civil No. 68-C-673); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.
Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967) (litigation commenced 1966, Civil No. 82-66); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.
3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971) (litigation commenced 1968, Civil No. 35017,
Los Angeles County Super Ct.); Board of Educ. of the School Dist. of the City of Detroit
v. Michigan (litigation commenced 1968, Civil No. 103342, Wayne County Cir. Ct., dismissed for lack of prosecution).
4 Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). In Mclnnis
v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. II1. 1968), the plaintiff asked that public school expenditures be allocated according to student needs. The court ruled that no discoverable and
manageable standards existed by which it could determine whether or not the Constitution
was violated. The United States Supreme Court affirmed, per curiam, Mclnnis v. Ogilvie,
394 U.S. 322 (1969). In Burrus v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), a three-judge
district court recognized the existing inequalities but indicated that it lacked the power,
knowledge, and means to effect a remedy and that the solution was more properly a legislative matter. As it had in Mclnnis, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Burrus, per curiam,
397 U.S. 44 (1970).
5 Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d at 589, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal, Rptr. at 604.
6 J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, supra note 2, at 2.
7 Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. at 327.
81d. at 331.
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trality standard "does not involve the Court in the intricacies of affirmatively
requiring that expenditures be made in a certain manner or amount."9
The fiscal neutrality principle was strongly criticized, in part because
alternative methods of financing education would seem to require the
elimination of the local property tax as a revenue source for education,
with diversion of revenues from noneducational services and the elimination of local autonomy. 10 The standard was also criticized because
its principal proponents also advocated district power/ equalizing (equal
dollars for equal tax effort regardless of property wealth-which does
permit local choice) as the preferred method of financing schools. Some
a "fiscally neutral" system with district power
courts appeared to equate
I
equalizing (DPE)."
The fiscal neutrality principle and DPE have also been attacked for failing to recognize the problems of the central cities. The litigation had
focused on the correlation between high property values and high per pupil
expenditure levels. Affluent school districts could spend more per pupil than
districts of-lower property wealth, frequently with lower tax rates. The fiscal
neutrality principle was devised in response to these conditions. While application of this principle would help low property wealth districts, it would
not necessarily benefit central city districts, which have comparatively high
12
propertyvalues and often higher than average per pupil expenditure levels.
The fiscal difficulties of central city schools are attributable not to low property
values but to higher costs for both educational and noneducational public
services. Thus minimal compliance with a wealth-free standard could result
in central cities losing education funds while having to pay still higher taxes. 3
Another objection to ,DPE, as indicated by one of the contributorg to
this symjposium, is that it makes a child's constitutional right to an education
subject to the whim of the electorate in his district.14 Since the level of
local spending would vary according to the wishes of local district voters,
the level of expenditure for a child's education would still depend on his
residence. This seems inconsistent with the rationale upon which the fiscal
neutrality principle is- premised-that education 'is a fundamental right.1 5
9 Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. at 284.
10 The arguments against the fiscal neutrality or the wealth-free principle are thoroughly
"reviewed in Carrington, Financing the American Dream: Equality and School Taxes, 73 CoLum.
L. REv. 1227 (1973).
11 In Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 876-77 (D. Minn. 1971), the court tuggested that "the fiscal neutrality principle not only removes discrimination by wealth" but
also allows free play to local effort and choice."
12 See B. LEVIN, T. MULLER, W. SCANLON, & M. COHEN, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE: PRESENT

(1972).
See, e.g., B. LEVIN, T. MULLER & C. SANDOVAL, THE HIGH COST OF EDUCATION IN CITIES 7071 (1973); Berke & Callahan, Serrano v. Priest: Milestone or Millstone for School Finance, 21 J.
PUB. L. 23, 57-64 (1972. See also J. CALLAHAN, W. WILKEN & M. SILLERMAN, URBAN SCHOOLS AND
DISPARITIES AND FISCAL ALTERNATIVES

13

SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM: PROMISE AND REALITY (1973).
4

" A community with a high proportion of nonpublic school enrollment or with a ma-

jority of retired residents may vote a low tax rate, and hence a low expenditure level, penalizing

the minority of child-bearing families who may desire a higher level of expenditure.
15 Levin, Alternatives to the Present System of School Finance: Their Problems and Prospects,
61 GEo. L.J. 879, 920-21 (1973).

FoRFwoRD
Despite these criticisms, the fiscal neutrality principle and the legal
arguments developed by Professor Coons and his colleagues were eagerly
seized upon by lawyers throughout the country who were seeking to overturn their states' systems of school finance. Between August 30, 1971,
when the California Supreme Court handed down its decision in Serrano v.
Priest, and March 21, 1973, when the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its
decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,16 a tidal
wave of school finance litigation engulfed the country. By early 1973, courts
in'Minnesota, Texas, New Jersey, Arizona, Wyoming, Kansas and Michigan
reached essentially the same holding as the California Supreme Court. All to17
gether, some fifty-two actions were filed in thirty-one states.
The Serrano decision and its progeny held that the school finance
system -violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
of the Federal Constitution. 18 The California court found that the system's
reliance on the local property tax as a source of education revenues, due
to variations among districts in taxable property, resulted in substantial disparities in per pupil revenues. Since state subventions failed to offset these disparities, the state's school financing system discriminated on the basis of district
property wealth, which the court held to be a "suspect classification"
for purposes of the equal protection clause. The Serrano court then concluded that education was a "fundamental right," and that this fundamental
right could not be conditioned on wealth. The court thus invoked the
strict scrutiny--rather than the rational basis-test, meaning that the state
bears the burden of showing a compelling state interest in the particular school
finance system utilized. Since the state was unable to show that the discrimination
was necessary to promote a compelling state interest, the system was unconstitutional.' 9
A three-judge federal district court in Texas, in a decision that paralleled Serrano, held that state's system of financing education unconstitutional, 20 and it was this case which ultimately was to be decided by
the U.S. Supreme Court. It was argued in October of 1972, and the following
March, a five-to-four decision was handed down reversing the district court.
The Supreme Court found that the system of school finance did not discriminate against any class of persons considered "suspect," since the case
did not present a definable class of poor persons (as opposed to poor districts). 2 ' Furthermore, education was not a fundamental right since it was
neither explicitly nor implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. 22 With
neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right involved, there
16411 U.S. 1 (1973).
17 Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Intrastate School Finance Court Cases,

Aug. 1972.
18 While the complaint in Serrano was also based on the state "equal protection"
clause, the court primarily relied on the Federal Constitution. 5 Cal. 3d at 596, 487 P.2d at
1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
19
1d. at 584, 487 P.2d at 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 601.
20 Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. at 280.
21 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
22 Id. at 35.
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was no basis on which to invoke the strict scrutiny test.2 3 The Court
therefore turned to the rational basis test and found that the Texas system
of school financing rationally furthered a legitimate state purpose: to
encourage "a large measure of participation in the control of each dis24
trict's schools at the local level.
With this decision, the fiscal neutrality principle articulated by Coons,
Clune, and Sugarman-which in the less than three years since its birth had
received considerably more attention and notoriety than doctrines of much
older vintage-appeared to have been given its funeral. 25 The question now is
what happens to school finance reform in the next decade. While the
Rodriguez opinion does not totally rule out the possibility of invalidating
a state's school financing system on the basis of the federal equal protection
clause, 2 6 most school finance reform advocates are turning away from the
federal courts as a forum for change. This symposium explores alternative
routes that may be open to reformers.
It should be noted that while five members of the Rodriguez Court
found that the way in which education dollars are now distributed is
"rational," and therefore not unconstitutional, the Court did not find the
existing system of financing schools to be equitable or just.2 7 Thus the
decision may act as a goad to state legislatures to reform their school finance statutes without the necessity of court action. This symposium explores
several alternative ways of financing education, including one which
focuses on the family or the child as the basic decision-making unit rather
than the local school district, and analyzes some of the legislative reforms
which have already been enacted under the stimulus of the initial Serrano
wave of litigation. While the reforms lessen reliance on the local property
tax through substantial increases in the state share and narrow the range
of variations in expenditures and tax rates, save-harmless clauses and
other similar provisions suggest that political compromise remains essential
to success, and that reform may be incremental rather than overnight.
Moreover, the reforms may be unstable, depending upon the political forces
in sway at any one time. For example, as this issue went to press, the Florida
legislature repealed its newly enacted DPE provision and restored the nonequalized millage.2 1 Some additional problems not dealt with in this symposium,
23

24

Id. at 40.

/d. at 49.
commentator has said that "[tihe real trouble with Rodriguez may be
that it came 10 years before its time (or, given the venturesomeness of the Warren court,
five years after its time)." Kirp, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez:
Chaotic, Unjust-and Constitutional,2 J. LAW & EDUc. 461, 462 (1973).
2'See Tractenberg, Reforming School Finance Through State Constitutions: Robinson
v. Cahill Points the Way, 27 RUTGERs L. Rxv. 365, 373-84 (1974).
21 For example, Justice Powell--who wrote the majority opinion in Rodriguez-noted
that "[t]he need is apparent for reform in tax systems which may well have relied too
long and too heavily on the local property tax." 411 U.S. at 58. Justice Stewart, concurring,
added: "The method of financing public schools in Texas, as in almost every other State, has
resulted in a system of public education that can fairly be described as chaotic and unjust."
Id. at 59.
2 The Florida legislation, as modified in the most recent legislative session, is still
quite reformist in nature. One of the reasons for repeal of the DPE provision was the fact that it
25 One
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which may act as constraints on reform unless resolved, are the fear of loss
of local control-a particular concern of suburban districts, 29 the concern
that additional revenues will be absorbed by increases in teachers' salaries and
30
fringe benefits rather than be used for improving educational programs,
and the related concern that the rapidly increasing costs of education are not
associated with improvement in the quality of education.
This last concern is one of the most persistent questions raised in discussions of school finance reform: whether revising a school finance system so that more funds are available to poor school districts will make a
difference in the education of the children in those districts. Recent research has cast doubt upon the cost-quality relationship in education. 3 1 The
assumption that money can make a difference, thus militating toward the
elimination of wealth-based disparities in per pupil expenditures to meet
the national goal of equal educational opportunity, has been severely
shaken. The efforts of courts to resolve the cost-quality issue is discussed
in this symposium and various standards for defining equal educational
opportunity are analyzed.
For more recalcitrant state legislatures, the pressure of a court decision
may still be an essential prerequisite to reform. Less than a month after the
Supreme Court's Rodriguez decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in
Robinson v. Cahill,3 2 struck down that state's school finance statutes
as violative of a state constitutional provision guaranteeing a "thorough
and efficient" school system. The rationale put forward by the court suggests
alternative litigation strategies which reformers might pursue. The approach
taken by the Robinson v. Cahill court and those taken in several other
states are also described in this symposium.
At the height of the litigation efforts, many school finance reform advocates called for a substantial increase in the federal role in the financing

33
of elementary and secondary education-from its present seven per cent
of the total education dollar to as much as thirty-five per cent.3 4 However, as

the euphoria resulting from the legal victories has subsided, a more carefully
considered analysis indicates that a substantial increase in the federal contribution to education is unlikely in the next decade. This reinforces the view, expressed in this symposium and elsewhere, that reform will have to come from
within the states.
The conclusion one can draw from the articles in this symposium is
that while Rodriguez may have temporarily slowed the reform movement,
acted as an incentive to increase millage rates, with many districts raising expenditures by 25 to
30 per cent over the previous year. Telephone interview with Dr. Marshall A. Harris, Special
Assistant on Education, Office of the Governor of Florida, July 8, 1974. The legislature apparently
felt that spending priorities were being distorted by the availability of equalized dollars.
29 See M. COHEN, B. LEVIN & R. BEAVER, THE POLITICAL LIMITS TO SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM
121-23 (1973).
30
See Moynihan, Equalizing Education--In Whose Benefit?, PUBLIC INTEREST, Fall 1972, at 69,
74-75.
1
3 J. COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966); C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY (1972).
32 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
33 R. REISCHAUER & R. HARTMAN, supra note 1, at 5, 9.
34
Id. at 165.
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the principal effect of the decision was merely to change its direction. The
efforts that went into the litigation of school finance reform on federal
equal protection grounds in the period between the first Serrano decision and the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez were not in
vain. Perhaps the most important contribution of that litigation was to
make citizens and legislators more aware of the deficiencies and irrationalities of the current system for financing schools. An understanding of
the system and the resulting inequalities in the raising and distributing
of educational funds is no longer limited to a few school finance "experts."
No introduction to the issues of school finance reform would be complete without an acknowledgement of the work of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, which, since the first school finance
lawsuit, has coordinated and assisted school finance reform legal efforts
across the country. With the setback delivered by Rodriguez, the Lawyers'
Committee has begun to explore the education and equal protection provisions of the fifty state constitutions and has continued to disseminate
information to attorneys with pending school finance suits. While his name
does not appear on any of the articles in this symposium, R. Stephen
Browning, Director of the Lawyers' Committee's School Finance Project,
has provided many helpful suggestions toward its development and it is
with gratitude that I acknowledge his assistance.
BETSY LEVIN
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